Crucial electoral year for European radical Left

The date of the first challenge in Greece is already set for Sunday 25 January; at least seven other countries will follow, with expected dates in March (Estonia), April (Finland), May (the UK), September (Denmark and Portugal), October (Poland) and November (Spain). More than the sheer number of European citizens called to the polls, however, what makes the vote a crucial test for this party family are its political implications. Radical left parties are currently topping the polls in two of the eight countries: SYRIZA in Greece and PODEMOS in Spain – an unusual event in the post-1970s landscape, where communist and radical left forces have traditionally been dwarfed by mainstream centre-left and centre-right parties.1 A victory in these two countries would therefore represent the second opportunity, after the unsuccessful experiment of the Cypriot Christofias cabinet in 2008-2013, to see a party of the European radical left at the helm of an alternative governmental coalition, thereby testing the validity of its anti-neoliberal socio-economic programme and the permeability of the European Union to its demands.

The electoral calendar

The background data on the eight upcoming elections are summarised in Table 1. In aggregate terms, the radical left looks set to build on the momentum of the 2014 European Parliament election and double its vote share (from 7.13% to 13-15%). Both expected results and expected gains, however, are very unequally distributed. Present indicators point to no sign of life (below 1%) in the traditionally weak UK, Poland and Estonia, overall stability at medium levels (8-17%) in Denmark2, Portugal and Finland and a spectacular growth in Spain (above 30%) and Greece (above 40%). The attention of all observers is set on the Greek election this Sunday, where a success of the radical left might have serious repercussions on the governance and policies of the whole European Union.  
Table 1. LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS TO BE HELD IN 2015 (EU COUNTRIES)

	Last legislative election		2014 EU election	Latest opinion polls *	Upcoming legislative election	Current trend vs. 2010-2012
	YEAR	%	%		2015
GREECE	2012	31.85	33.83	~41.2 %	25 Jan	Soaring
ESTONIA	2011	0.00	0.07	–	1 Mar	Stable
FINLAND	2011	8.56	9.66	~8.8 %	Apr	Stable/up
UK	2010	0.82	1.26	–	7 May	Stable
DENMARK	2011	16.04	18.99	~16.8 %	Sep	Stable/up
PORTUGAL	2011	14.88	20.96	~14.5 %	Sep/Oct	Stable
POLAND	2011	0.55	0.00	–	Oct	Down
SPAIN	2011	9.46	20.74	~32.3 %	Nov	Soaring
TOTAL		7.13	12.61
AVERAGE		10.27	13.19

Note: * estimates based on the latest opinion polls (10.2014-1.2015).

Greece, the weakest link of Neoliberalism

In Greece the radical left party SYRIZA3, which in 2012 suddenly transformed from a small and fractious coalition into the main opposition force of the country, is trying to consolidate its lead over Samaras’ conservative Nea Dimokratia and to win a parliamentary majority for its programme of anti-neoliberal change (see Table 2).
Table 2. GREEK ELECTIONS

	2007	2009	May 2012	May 2012	EP 2014	LATEST POLLS*
Valid votes on the total electorate	72.2%	69.1%	63.6%	61.9%	57.7%
RADICAL LEFT	13.9%	12.8%	26.9%	31.9%	33.8%	41.2%
SYRIZA	5.0%	4.6%	16.8%	26.9%	26.6%	35.2%
KKE	8.2%	7.5%	8.5%	4.5%	6.1%	5.5%
OTHERS	0.7%	0.7%	1.6%	0.5%	1.2%	0.5%
PASOK	38.1%	43.9%	13.2%	12.3%	8.0%	4.9%
ND	41.8%	33.5%	18.9%	29.7%	22.7%	31.1%
GOLDEN DAWN	0.0%	0.3%	7.0%	6.9%	9.4%	5.9%
OTHERS	6.1%	9.5%	34.1%	19.3%	26.0%	16.9%
TOTAL	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Note: * estimates based on the latest opinion polls (1.2015).

On the first account, the latest opinion polls suggest a stable and relatively clear margin of 2-6 percentage points. Political scientist Gerassimos Moschonas sees the Greek public opinion as oscillating between contradictory feelings of “hope”, “rage” and “fear”; the seating prime minister Antonis Samaras, in particular, hopes to pull off a surprise come back by capitalising on the fear of a leap in the dark and of the reprisals of the financial markets and of the European partners. On the second account, the sizeable premium attributed by the electoral law to the first party (50 seats out of 300) makes it possible to form a parliamentary majority with as little as 35-38% of the valid votes.

The other countries

In the other countries the partisan radical left seem to be roughly stable around the values of the preceding election, with one major exception: Spain. Here the opinion polls indicate a clear surge of the radical left, by now clearly the first party family of the country. The main beneficiary, however, is not one of the traditional forces of the fragmented Spanish left (the components of the IU alliance, radical regionalist groups, minor far-left parties) but a completely new organisation: PODEMOS. The party, established in January 2014 by the confluence of a group of left-wing intellectuals around political scientist Pablo Iglesias and the far-left organisation Izquierda Anticapitalista, has stunned the Spanish establishment by winning 8.2% of the votes in the European Parliament election in May and rapidly rising above 20% of the voting intentions, competing with the conservative PP for the first place. These events are likely to lead to a temporary gridlock of the political system, already weakened by a series of corruption scandals and the rise of Catalan (and Basque) independentism.
Tabele 3. SPANISH ELECTIONS

	2008	2011	EP 2014	LATEST POLLS *
Valid votes on the total electorate	72.6%	67.1%	42.0%
RADICAL LEFT	4.9%	9.5%	20.8%	32.6%
IU + allies	3.8%	7.0%	10.3%	4.4%
PODEMOS	–	–	8.2%	25.8%
Radical regionalists	1.0%	2.2%	2.1%	2.2%
Others	0.1%	0.3%	0.2%	0.3%
PSOE	44.4%	29.2%	23.6%	20.3%
PP	40.4%	44.7%	26.7%	25.6%
MAIN REGIONALISTS	6.1%	7.3%	9.7%	6.7%
OTHERS	4.2%	9.3%	19.2%	14.8%
TOT	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Note: * estimates based on the latest opinion polls (12.2014-1.2015).

Conclusion

The future of the European radical left now clearly rests on the electoral victory of SYRIZA on Sunday and on the concrete results of its subsequent governmental experiment. A moderate success in departing from austerity and reviving growth and the welfare state is likely to embolden the radical left across the whole European periphery: PODEMOS in Spain, the Sinn Féin in Ireland, ZD in Slovenia, PCP and BE in Portugal, and even the troubled Italian scene. A failure, however, might have devastating consequences on the credibility of an alternative to neoliberalism. Crucial for both outcomes will be the capacity of the radical left of the core continental countries (Germany, France, the Netherlands…) to find a way to break the glass ceiling of 13% of the valid votes and to become truly credible alternatives to both mainstream parties and a dangerous far right.

Notes

1. With the only exception of Cyprus, where the communist AKEL has always remained the second or first (2001-2011) strongest party of the country. See DUNPHY, R. & BALE, T. (2007) “Red flag still flying? Explaining AKEL – Cyprus’ Communist anomaly”, Party Politics, 13(3): 287-304.
2. The figures include both the radical Green-Left Alliance (E) and the more moderate Socialist People’s Party (SF), which is now considered by some authors to fall outside of the boundaries of the radical left party family. The former is currently in ascendancy with opinion poll values around 9-11%.
3. See DINAS, E. & RORI, L. (2013) “The 2012 Greek parliamentary elections: fear and loathing at the polls”, West European Politics, 36(1): 270-281; SPOURDALAKIS, M. (2014) “The miraculous rise of the ‘phenomenon SYRIZA’”, International Critical Thought, 4(3): 354-366; KARITZIS, A. (2014) “What is SYRIZA and what it isn’t?”, http://www.transform-network.net/en/blog/blog-2014/news/detail/Blog/-b60c39c253.html